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What eﬀect would a Brexit have on the UK’s economy? Kent Matthews gives three reasons
why Britain leaving the EU may have a positive economic impact for the country. He argues that a
Brexit would reduce prices, free businesses from over-zealous regulations, and allow the UK to
redirect the money it currently pays into the EU budget toward more pressing priorities.
The most compelling arguments for a Brexit are not necessarily economic ones. The matter of
sovereignty, rule by bureaucracy, and the democratic deﬁcit are all much more powerful arguments
for the leave campaign. But an economic argument does exist, and on balance it also favours a
Brexit.
The ﬁrst step in outlining this case is to dispense with the argument that access to the single market trumps all
arguments for an exit. The remain campaign contends that not being part of the EU will close the UK oﬀ from the
single market in some capacity. In reality, the single market is a protectionist customs union that places sizeable
tariﬀ barriers around manufactures and agriculture. Together these two sectors only account for about 11% of UK
GDP. However, there is no EU trade barrier on services which accounts for nearly 80% of the UK economy.
But before we look at the potential costs for UK manufacturing we need to be aware of some facts. First, the UK
exports less goods to the rest of the EU than it imports from the EU. The trade deﬁcit with the rest of the EU in
goods was £85.3bn in 2015, compared with a deﬁcit of £20.7bn with the non-EU. Furthermore, our trade deﬁcit with
the rest of the EU has been widening since 2008, while our deﬁcit with the rest of the world has fallen during the
same period.
Second, contrary to what is popularly believed, Germany is not our biggest export market. While it is true that 44
percent of our exports go to the EU, it follows that 56 percent of our exports are to non-EU countries. Our biggest
single goods export market in 2015 was the United States (15%), followed by Germany (10%), Switzerland (7%)
and China (6%). Imports from the EU account for 53 percent of total goods imports and Germany is the single
biggest country that makes up 15 percent of the total. Finally, we had a surplus of £30bn with our trade in services
across Europe in 2014, while the top 5 countries in the EU’s services trade were in surplus by £8bn.
The point in these facts is that as far as the single market is concerned, tariﬀs on UK goods exports will also
damage the rest of the EU’s exports to the UK and as they export more to us than the other way round, the stakes
are high. It would pay both parties to agree on trade arrangements that are not damaging to trade. But with trade in
services, where the UK has an enormous comparative advantage, the single market leaves it unaﬀected.
Three economic arguments for Brexit
There are three key economic arguments for Brexit: a trade argument, an argument concerning regulation, and an
argument focused on distribution. In the ﬁrst case, the EU places protective barriers around manufacturing and
agriculture, but leaves services largely unaﬀected. Inside the EU, the prices of manufacturing and agricultural
products are higher than world market prices. But tariﬀ barriers are not the whole story, various non-tariﬀ barriers
also exist that are diﬃcult to quantify.
Research by Patrick Minford and others has quantiﬁed the joint eﬀect of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers, estimating a
20% premium on world prices. As such, almost any trade agreement with the EU that reduces the import prices of
protected goods will be an improvement. Suppose the extreme case is simply to ‘walk away’ and impose no
retaliatory tariﬀs on EU imports. Minford and his colleagues estimate that general prices will fall by 8% in this
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scenario and economic welfare will increase by 4% of
GDP. Manufacturing would diminish as the protective
tariﬀs bite, but this will also release resources to the
competitive services sector that will expand.
In this exercise it is assumed that agriculture would
continue to be supported by the government to stay
at the same size, however this would be a worst case
scenario. Faced with possible retaliatory tariﬀs on EU
exports to the UK, a better deal would allow
manufacturing to continue to trade freely in the EU.
The current agreement gives manufacturing free
entry to the EU but at the cost of high import prices.
The alternative is to negotiate an agreement with the
EU that is favourable to manufacturing for both
parties and simply continue to trade under WTO rules
with the rest of the world as we currently do, without
individual trade agreements. Therefore, the only
trade agreement we need to have is with the EU and
it is not necessary, as has been suggested, to
negotiate multiple trade agreements with all other trade blocs.
The second economic argument relates to the regulatory zeal of the European Commission that has placed
numerous and unnecessary burdens on businesses. The rules and regulations of the single market relate to the 44
percent of exports to the EU. This is less than 15% of GDP but all those regulations apply to the remaining 85% of
the economy. There are four areas of regulation, as identiﬁed by Tim Congdon.
First, the EU has been at the forefront in pronouncing the dangers of global warming and has forced member states
to replace low-cost energy sources with high-cost energy sources. The result has been to drive up costs in the steel
and heavy industries, with the crisis in the steel industry being one of the outcomes. Second, the ‘social chapter’ and
the creation of social legislation have again added to the costs of business which is estimated to cost 1% of GDP.
Third, ﬁnancial regulation has passed from the UK to EU bodies which threaten the most proﬁtable square mile of
London as a ﬁnancial centre. According to the 2014, UK Government competency review on ﬁnancial services,
‘Over the last ten years, there has been a roughly ten-fold increase in the volume of EU law on ﬁnancial services’.
Fourth, there are a huge number of regulations that ban substances and manage processes that is part of the
harmonisation drive of the single market. Regulation creates allocative distortions that aﬀect output, productivity and
employment. The acquis communautaire is 170,000 pages long and that is particularly costly for the SME sector.
Of course it can be argued that trying to evaluate the costs of regulation comes up against the counterfactual that
perhaps the regulations adopted by the UK government would be even more draconian than what the EU imposes.
While this argument is diﬃcult to counter it is unlikely that the UK government would actively hamper business in this
way, but anyway there is a democratic process that can deﬁne the degree of ‘business friendliness’ which is skewed
within the EU.
Finally, we come to the distribution argument. The EU provides funds to agriculture, scientiﬁc research, universities
and many other recipients in the promotion of its wider objectives of a more integrated and socially cohesive
Europe. What is important to understand is that it is not the EU but the UK taxpayer that ultimately provides these
funds.
In 2014 the gross contribution by the UK to the EU budget was £18.8 billion. Subtracting the rebate (‘abatement’) of
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£4.4 billion left a total contribution after the rebate of £14.4 billion. Subtracting a further £4.6 billion for UK recipients
leaves a net contribution in 2014 of £9.8 billion. HM Treasury estimates that the net contribution in 2015 will have
been £8.5 billion (more than twice the number in 2009) and forecasts that this will rise to £11.1 billion in 2016. The
net contribution by the UK to the EU has been rising systematically in real terms since 1973.
Now a well-established principle in welfare economics is that if the gainers can compensate the losers in any cost-
beneﬁt calculation then there is a net welfare improvement. What is important to realise is that as a net payer to the
EU budget the UK is well able to compensate the losers in a post Brexit world. However, price support systems and
subsidies, as in the Common Agricultural Policy, result in a misallocation of resources. The removal of the price
support payments will have the additional beneﬁts of lowering prices to consumers.
From a political economy standpoint the gainers (the UK consumer) may want to compensate the losers (farmers).
But that leaves two important questions. First, how should the gainers compensate the losers, and second can the
UK government credibly commit to compensating these losers? Regarding the ﬁrst question, the least distortionary
method of compensation is to provide a lump-sum subsidy that will leave production decisions unaﬀected by
interventions. This would simply be a means of cushioning the ﬁnancial impact on those recipients who have grown
dependent on funds disbursed by the EU.
The second question is harder. There is no credible way a future government can pre-commit to spending the
Brexit-dividend in the way the EU currently does. This is particularly so as much of the EU spending may be
ineﬃcient, not allocated to the right areas, for the right reasons. It may be politically defensible to promise the losers
in the short term that they will be protected but in the longer term this will have to be balanced against how the
resources may be better used. Each lobby group would make their case to government which in a democratic world
will be balanced against the greater good. That is how democracy works.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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